During critical realignments, citizens are able to reject past habitual behaviors to produce fundamental changes in the partisan balance. These realignments may be produced by any of three dynamics: the conversion of active partisans, the mobilization of inactive citizens, or the demobilization of active voters. Determining which dynamics have produced critical realignments is essential for understanding how citizens hold political elites accountable and forge nonincremental political change. This paper makes three central contributions to our understanding of these dynamics. In contrast to previous studies, we examine the dynamics of all presidential realignments in American electoral history. Where previous studies have focused on national, sectional, or state levels of analysis, we focus on city-and county-level realignments, a critical advancement for an inherently local-level phenomenon such as critical realignments. Finally, unlike previous studies, we identify the factors that promote particular realignment dynamics. We find that the conversion of active partisans has produced most of the enduring change in local electoral behavior in the United States, with the relative contribution of different dynamics varying both across time and space. Political factors such as the strength of state and local parties, social factors such as the strength of local social networks, and demographic factors, such as the sizes of local immigrant populations, have each favored particular realignment dynamics in American electoral history.
accountability and democratic governance.
Despite realignment dynamics' theoretical importance, our understanding of these dynamics has been limited by several factors. These include weaknesses in our understanding of realignments, the exclusive focus of prior dynamics research on two critical realignments, and the generation of vague, conflicting, and noncomparable results by scholars employing diverse methodologies. 2 To address these problems this paper employs a normal vote approach (see, e.g., Converse 1966; Nardulli 1995; Nardulli 2005) to analyze a comprehensive set of presidential election returns. We employ data on presidential election returns for every county and most major cities in the continental United States from 1828 through 2000 to identify the contributions of conversion, mobilization, and demobilization to each county-and city-level realignment in American history.
The paper proceeds as follows. First, we engage the current controversy over the conceptual validity of critical realignments and argue for the continued utility of realignments for understanding voting behavior in American electoral history. Next, we outline the alternative theoretical perspectives on realignment dynamics. We next provide a brief introduction to the theoretical and methodological foundations of the normal vote analysis and present a 2 Prior studies of realignment dynamics analyze either aggregate electoral data or survey data.
Among the aggregate data studies, scholars alternatively draw ecological inferences using Goodman's regression (Kleppner 1987) , transition matrices (Wanat and Burke 1982) , differential equations (Brown 1991) , or correlation coefficients (Andersen 1979) . Among the survey studies, scholars either examine data from non-random New Deal-era Literary Digest surveys (Erikson and Tedin 1981) , or recalled partisanship from post-New Deal NES surveys (Andersen 1979) . Table 1 summarizes the results of these studies.
measurement strategy that produces a set of realignment dynamics measures for all cases of critical realignments (see Nardulli 2005) . Fourth, we apply these measures to the analysis of realignment dynamics. We estimate the relative importance of different dynamics, document how they varied across critical eras, and compare our results with prior findings. Next, we offer an analysis of the determinants of realignment dynamics. We conclude by discussing our findings' implications for the creation of nonincremental political change in American electoral history.
The Current Controversy over Realignments
The study of critical realignments has long been influential in the literatures on voting behavior and American political development. Critical realignments were among the seminal topics studied by political parties and behavior scholars such as Key (1955) and Schattschneider (1960). Key's insights on electoral change were subsequently transformed into a broader theory of political change, the realignment perspective (e.g., Burnham 1970; Clubb, Flanigan, and Zingale 1980) . The weak conceptual and methodological base of the realignment perspective on American political change, however, generated weak and conflicting empirical results. By the late 1980s, it was subjected to withering critiques (e.g., Carmines and Stimson 1989; Shafer 1991 ). More recently, Mayhew (2002, 165) has argued that this realignment perspective "is too slippery, too binary, too apocalyptic, and it has come to be too much of a dead end." Nardulli (1995 Nardulli ( , 2005 likewise acknowledges the limitations of the realignment perspective. He demonstrates, however, that although the realignment perspective was writ too large in its goal of providing an encompassing theory of political change, the concept of a critical realignment itself retains utility. The concept of a critical realignment as "an abrupt, large, and enduring form of change in prevailing electoral patterns, one that is initiated by a critical election and results in a significantly different partisan balance in the electorate" remains valid, even if realignments do not constitute a theory of political change in themselves (Nardulli 1995, 11) .
Employing this definition of critical realignments, Nardulli documents abrupt, large, and enduring electoral changes in normal voting patterns that have been spatially and temporally structured in American electoral history. Campbell (2006) likewise identifies distinct elections that constitute critical realignments.
A key to identifying critical realignments rests in recognizing that they are inherently local-level phenomena. In a nation as geopolitically diverse as the United States, it is unrealistic to either expect or demand that shifts in electoral behavior must sweep across most of the nation before a critical realignment can be diagnosed (Nardulli 1995, 11) . In fact, the expectation of national realignments, one that seems to have developed as a residue of the realignment perspective, is precisely at odds with Key's original conception of critical realignments as locallevel phenomena. As Key recognized, the issues and concerns of a realigning election have differential impacts on local electorates, producing realignments in some locales but not in others. Employing more extensive local-level data, Nardulli (1995 Nardulli ( , 2005 ) likewise documents the local-level nature of critical realignments and finds that these local realignments have been temporally structured, occurring during distinct critical eras in American electoral history, such as the Jim Crow, Industrial Revolution, and New Deal eras.
We must, as a consequence, diagnose critical realignments in the local electorates such as counties and cities in which they occur. But although realignments occur at the local level and therefore must be diagnosed at this level, these localized realignments can have significant aggregate impact on the national partisan balance. For example, in an era such as the Gilded Age in which the two parties were at rough parity at the national level, it did not take many localized realignments in 1896 to produce a significant change in the national partisan balance. Indeed, Campbell (2006) finds that such a significant realignment in partisan voting did occur in 1896.
In short, although Mayhew's critique of the realignment perspective as an encompassing theory of electoral change has merit, ample evidence documents abrupt, large, and enduring changes in partisan voting in local electorates in American history. These temporally and spatially structured enduring changes in voting behavior provide strong empirical evidence of critical realignments. Identifying the dynamics responsible for these realignments as well as their sources is thus essential for explaining enduring changes in voting behavior in the United States.
Theoretical Perspectives on Electoral Dynamics
The conversion, mobilization, and demobilization theses present competing expectations for how citizens forge nonincremental electoral change. Each rests on a different cognitive conception of the voting decision. As a consequence, the theses vary in their normative appeal, an implication that is often overlooked. Empirically, the theses also differ in the efficiency with which developments such as economic calamities, moral crises, and societal transformations are transformed into enduring electoral change. We examine each of these theses in turn.
The Conversion Thesis
The conversion thesis maintains that electorally active partisans fuel critical realignments by switching their allegiances from one party to another. 3 This thesis is based on a conception of electorally active citizens that emphasizes their ability to make informed judgments about political stewardship and to adjust their long-term partisan affiliations accordingly. The 3 The three theses are not mutually exclusive and each may play a role in producing a critical realignment. We present the three dynamics here as ideal types and later identify the relative contributions of each dynamic to particular critical realignments in our empirical analysis. conception of core voters upon which the conversion thesis rests is cognitively very demanding.
But it is also normatively appealing and instrumentally efficient. It presumes the perceptual skills and evaluative capacities of electorally active citizens are not unduly dulled by deeply rooted partisan affiliations. This provides for the efficient transformation of exogenous developments into electoral change, thereby enhancing electoral accountability. Because the conversion of a single voter involves both a loss in support for one party and a gain for its opponent, the conversion dynamic is the most efficient of the three dynamics in translating emerging political developments into enduring electoral change.
The Mobilization Thesis
The mobilization thesis contends that electoral shifts are generated by the incitement of inactive voters, the non-immunized. This thesis is based on the premise that long-term partisan attachments among core voters are so strong that perennially active voters are unable to switch allegiances even in the face of pressing external events. The mobilization thesis does, however, have some normative appeal in that past non-participation does not preclude citizens from becoming active voters in response to emerging political concerns. Because the mobilization of previous non-voters involves only a gain in support for one of the parties, it is only half as efficient as the conversion dynamic.
The Demobilization Thesis
The demobilization thesis posits that electoral shifts are caused by the alienation of the active, rather than the conversion of the committed or the incitement of the uninvolved. It underscores the importance of elites being attentive to the interests of core constituencies as well as providing for the loyalty of their generational replacements. While the demobilization thesis (like the conversion thesis) focuses on core partisans, it differs from the conversion thesis because it views partisanship as being too strong for conversions to be the dominant source of electoral change. In terms of efficiency it is equivalent to mobilization and much less efficient than conversion. Finally, being based on alienation and withdrawal, demobilization is the least normatively appealing of the three theses.
Previous Studies of Realignment Dynamics
Despite the clear normative importance of identifying the dynamics responsible for critical realignments in the American experience, our understanding of these dynamics remains surprisingly limited. Table 1 summarizes the findings of previous studies, along with a brief description of the data and methodologies used to produce them. The entries in Table 1 illustrate several points. The first is the narrowness of the knowledge base: the dynamics of only two critical realignments have ever been studied empirically. The second is the limitations of the data employed, especially in the aggregate data studies. Despite the fact that the incidence of critical realignments is likely to vary substantially at the local level, many of the aggregate analyses are based on national, sectional, or state-level data. None attempt to determine whether the electoral units included within the analysis, in fact, experienced critical realignments.
Moreover, most of these studies are based on narrow time frames (a handful of elections around the election being analyzed) and raw electoral returns. A third point about these studies is the imprecision of their findings. With the exception of Campbell (1985) , the results generated by these studies do not offer precise assessments of the contributions of various dynamic processes.
Finally, there is little convergence across studies. The only consensus appears to be that demobilization was not the operative dynamic in the New Deal Realignment.
Given this limited temporal and spatial focus, precision, and convergence, the existing literature on realignment dynamics has not sufficiently probed realignment dynamics' implications for electoral behavior. Nor, by extension, has this literature extended our understanding of enduring normative questions with which political scientists are concerned, such as electoral accountability and democratic governance. In the following sections, we present a more comprehensive analysis of realignment dynamics that identifies the dynamics, and the sources of the dynamics, responsible for all critical electoral change at the city and county levels in American history.
Gauging the Normal Voting Patterns of Local Electorates
Underlying this paper's macro-level study of electoral dynamics is the Michigan model The basic categorizations of citizens that flow from the Michigan model can be extended to the counties and cities that are the units of analysis for this study, employing eligible voters as the denominator for our measures. The eligible voters within these local electorates can be divided into three groups: core voters, peripheral voters, and habitual non-voters (see Figure 1 ).
It is expected that core voters have both stronger partisan attachments and deeper convictions about the importance and utility of voting than habitual non-voters and peripheral voters. Core voters can be further sub-divided into partisan constituencies that form a party's electoral base:
core Democratic voters, core Republican voters, and core minor party voters, as seen in Figure 1 .
Habitual Behavior and the Normal Voting Patterns of Local Electorates
To operationalize the model of the local electorate depicted in Figure 1 , a large amount of data at the city and county levels were collected, cleaned and assimilated. 4 The concept of a normal vote (see Converse 1966) Perhaps the most important contribution of the moving average approach is that it
provides for the precise definition and measurement of two forms of enduring electoral change:
critical realignments and periods of secular change.
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Within the moving average approach, critical realignments are defined as abrupt, large and enduring breaks in local normal voting patterns: a twenty-point break that endures for at least five elections. 6 An enduring twenty-point 4 The data for this analysis are part of a demographic, electoral, and political archive collected by Peter F. Nardulli and a team of researchers at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.
The data set includes observations for all counties and most major cities in the continental United States for each presidential election from 1828 to the present. 5 As Key (1959) recognized long ago, enduring electoral change can occur either through critical realignments (immediate structural shifts in voting patterns) or through secular change (gradual changes in voting patterns). The focus of this paper is on critical realignments. 6 The success of the approach used here can be appreciated by comparing the average change in the normal vote across pairs of presidential elections for cities and counties that experienced break in normal voting patterns constitutes a dramatic, durable shift in the normal partisan balance. Five presidential elections were chosen as the minimal period for enduring change because this period roughly encompasses a political generation.
The implementation of the moving average approach led to the identification of 3,836 city-and county-level critical realignments -out of 120,144 city-and county-level presidential election observations (about 3 percent of the total). Despite the fact that critical realignments are rare occurrences, they have a well-defined temporal structure. Ninety-seven percent of all critical elections fall within one of six political eras well known to political historians: the Jacksonian, the Ante Bellum, the Jim Crow, the Industrial Revolution, the New Deal, and the Civil Rights eras (see, e.g., Nardulli 2005) . Ninety percent of all enduring change (critical and secular) falls within these six periods.
Two measures of city-and county-level partisan voting are particularly central to our analysis and are helpful for demonstrating our normal vote approach to the study of There was only a modest increase of three points in Republican core voters, but the impact of this small increase was enhanced by a significant drop in Democratic core voters of 11 points and a smaller drop in minor party core voters of two points. Accompanying these changes was an increase in non-voters of 10 points. A simpler situation prevailed in the 1928-1932 sequence.
The core voting electorate remained constant but Democratic core voters increased by seven points, while Republican core voters declined by six points and minor party core voters by a single point.
The Dynamics of Electoral Change: A Measurement Strategy
The patterns of changes in the normal vote variables reflected in Figure 3 suggest a measurement strategy for gauging electoral dynamics. This measurement strategy builds on Andersen's (1979) insights about the importance of focusing on shifts in the eligible electorate as opposed to merely the active electorate in understanding electoral dynamics (see Figure 1 ).
Her key insight is that, without a focus on movements over time in the eligible electorate, it is not possible to determine whether an electoral shift is due to the reshuffling of partisans within the core electorate (conversion) or to a change in the size of the core electorate (mobilization or demobilization).
As with any study that seeks to make ecological inferences from aggregate data, our analysis rests on an assumption regarding individual-level behavior. Within our approach, we employ the simplest movement of the smallest number (SMSN) assumption. The SMSN assumption holds that the patterns of electoral change analyzed here are the result of the simplest conceivable movement involving the smallest number of voters in the city or county. This assumption is consistent with the view that there is a heavy habitual component to voting that puts serious constraints on electoral change. In the accompanying technical appendix we discuss this assumption and summarize the results of an empirical test that examines its validity.
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The strategy developed here represents significant progress in the study of electoral dynamics. It is a marked improvement over survey based approaches because they are based on partisan recall questions, which are notoriously unreliable (Niemi, Katz, and Newman 1980), or early, non-random survey data (e.g., the Literary Digest poll), which are highly questionable.
Also, because of the relatively recent introduction of survey techniques, survey-based approaches are inapplicable to most realignments experienced within the U.S. The strategy developed here is also a marked improvement over earlier aggregate data approaches, which also must make ecological inferences. Compared to these approaches, our strategy 1) generates more precise estimates of realignment dynamics, 2) produces a more encompassing set of estimates that can be compared across eras and locales, and 3) holds the potential to move beyond the mere description of dynamic processes, which is the focus of existing studies, to identify the sources of realignment dynamics. 7 The principal approach to ecological inference in political science, King's (1997) EI approach, has received criticism on several dimensions in recent years (see, e.g., Freedman et al. 1998; Herron and Schotts 2004) , including its susceptibility to biased parameter estimates in the presence of aggregation bias (Cho 1998; Cho and Gaines 2004; Freedman et al. 1998) . As a consequence, we do not employ King's EI approach in our analysis.
The estimates produced here are more precise than those produced by previous studies for three reasons. First, our approach is based on the analysis of normal vote variables rather than raw vote variables. This is important because inferences about realignment dynamics require estimates of changes in normal voting patterns, not raw vote returns. If raw electoral returns are used, estimates will be contaminated by short-term electoral turbulence, as can be seen by comparing the margin of victory and normal partisan balance measures in Figure 2 . Using normal vote variables eliminates the effects of short-term noise. Second, our approach allows us to differentiate between local electorates that experienced critical change and those that did not, making it possible to derive estimates of conversion, mobilization, and demobilization solely from the analysis of realigning units. This is a significant point because of the local-level nature of realignments. The failure to focus on realigning units would introduce much noise into the estimation of realignment dynamics. Finally, our estimates of dynamics are expressed in terms of a common denominator (net partisan gain) that allows us to make more precise statements about the relative importance of different dynamics. This common denominator also provides for the comparison of different dynamics across critical eras and locales.
Our approach also provides for a more complete examination of electoral dynamics because, while previous work focuses on either the Industrial or New Deal realignments, we analyze all presidential realignments in the U.S. since 1828. Finally, our approach enables us to move beyond the mere description of electoral dynamics because we are able to integrate relevant independent variables with our local-level realignment dynamics variables. This enables us to examine the factors that affect the dynamics of critical realignments. The inclusiveness of the data base, and our ability to integrate it with other data, underscore the importance of having measures of realignment dynamics that are comparable across time and space.
Differenced Normal Votes, Net Partisan Gains and Dynamic Processes
Applying Andersen's insights to the normal vote variables depicted in Figure 1 Implicit in each of the three realignment dynamics theses is a logic that relates net Democratic or Republican gains to changes in the four core voting populations (core voters, core Democratic voters, core Republican voters, and core minor party voters). The next section lays out these logics.
Difference Patterns and the Logic of Electoral Dynamics
It facilitates the presentation of the different realignment dynamics to introduce an analytical tool we will refer to as a difference pattern. A difference pattern is simply an ordered set of elements that includes the four differenced normal core voter measures mentioned above.
By stipulation, the ordering of the differenced normal vote variables is as follows: change in core voters, change in core Democratic voters, change in core Republican voters, change in core minor party voters. To simplify the identification of realignment dynamics, the elements of the difference patterns will reflect only the signs of the variables. Thus, a difference pattern of (+,0,+,0) indicates increases in core voters and core Republican voters and no change in core Democratic voters or core minor party voters across a pair of presidential elections in a county or city.
Using, for illustrative purposes, the situation in which there is a net Republican gain, Table 2 demonstrates how difference patterns can be used to identify the dynamics that produce enduring electoral change. It does this by identifying the types of difference patterns that would have to exist if all of the observed net gain in a city or county were due to just one of the three realignment dynamics. Thus, Table 2 is concerned with the logic underlying a set of "ideal While the examples embodied in Table 2 reflect only "ideal types," the distribution of actual difference patterns indicated that these "pure" dynamic processes account for almost 70% of all realignment dynamics. More importantly, the vast majority of cases involving mixed dynamic processes, and over 90% of all cases, had difference patterns that allowed for the unambiguous allocation of gains across dynamic processes (i.e., given the SMSN assumption, the tenability of which is assessed in the accompanying Appendix, the sources of the net partisan gains are clear).
The Dynamics of Critical Realignments: An Empirical Overview
We use these four core normal vote variables to estimate the dynamics that have produced all critical realignments in presidential voting at the city-and county-levels since 1828 We can gain more insights into the picture of realignment dynamics generated here by examining realignment dynamics by critical eras and comparing the results with the state of knowledge in the field. As noted earlier, 97 percent of all critical realignments fall within six eras in American history. Embedded in these six critical eras (the Jacksonian, the Ante Bellum, the Jim Crow, the Industrial Revolution, the New Deal and the Civil Rights eras) are eight sets of temporally and spatially structured critical realignments, some of which involve crosscutting partisan shifts within the same era. These critical realignments are labeled as follows: the Whig, Slavery -Republican, Slavery -Democratic, Jim Crow, Industrial -Democratic, IndustrialRepublican, New Deal, and Civil Rights realignments (the party names reference the party benefiting from the electoral change in eras with crosscutting critical electoral shifts). These critical elections occurred at very different junctures in American history and were spurred by different issues. Consequently, we might expect the dynamics driving critical electoral change to have varied across eras.
The results in Figure 4 support this expectation. While conversion has produced at least 60% of the enduring change in every critical era, its relative contribution has varied somewhat by era. Conversion accounts for, on average, 91 percent of the net partisan gains in five of the 9 Separate analyses show that demobilization has played a larger role in producing secular electoral change. Thirty-seven percent of all secular change has been produced by demobilization, 44 percent by conversion, and only 19 percent by mobilization.
eight realignments: the Whig, Slavery -Republican, Slavery -Democratic, IndustrialDemocratic, and Industrial -Republican realignments. Conversion accounts, on average, for just over 67 percent of the critical gains for the other three realignments: the Jim Crow, New Deal, and Civil Rights realignments. Mobilization accounted for more than 10 percent of net partisan gains in only two realignments: the New Deal (31 percent) and Civil Rights realignments (39 percent). It is instructive to note that both of these critical realignments occurred after the dramatic decline in turnout rates at the turn of the twentieth century. It was not until the twentieth century, when large pools of non-voters were available, that mobilization became important. This point underscores the importance of a temporally inclusive analysis: the distinctiveness of twentieth century patterns is only clear when compared to nineteenth century patterns. Finally, demobilization, the least normatively appealing of the three realignment dynamics, played an important role in only the Jim Crow realignment (28 percent). This realignment was unique for a variety of reasons, not the least of which is that it was generated, in large part, by the disenfranchisement of former slaves and poor whites.
The Determinants of Realignment Dynamics: An Empirical Assessment
The dynamic process variables, comparable across time and space, provide the capacity to move beyond mere description in the study of realignment dynamics. This is essential to progress in this field because the global summaries of electoral dynamics reported above mask a good deal of variation. For example, while conversion from a major party, on average, accounts for 53 percent of all net partisan gains, the proportion of critical change in a county or city traceable to conversion ranges from 0 (13 percent of all cases) to 1 (12 percent of all cases).
Half of all locales experiencing a critical realignment have a value on this conversion variable from .41 to .93. Conversion from a minor party accounts for 16 percent of all net partisan gains, but this proportion ranges from 0 (55 percent of all cases) to 1 (.6 percent of all cases). Onethird of all locales experiencing a critical realignment have a value on this variable that ranges from .02 to .75. The proportion of critical change traceable to mobilization ranges from 0 (44 percent of all cases) to 1 (6 percent of all cases), with 25 percent of the cases ranging from .06 to .64. For 80 percent of the counties or cities experiencing critical realignments, the proportion of critical change traceable to demobilization is zero, although this variable does range as high as 1 (2 percent of all cases).
This variation in dynamic processes underscores the need to obtain a theoretically driven and empirically based understanding of the factors that account for realignment dynamics. We know of no studies that examine the factors that shape these dynamics. However, the normal vote framework provides some testable insights into the factors that generate realignment dynamics.
Theoretical Considerations
The normal vote framework is premised on the assertion that, during periods of political normalcy, habit structures electoral behavior and, hence, local voting patterns (see Figure 2 ).
The structure of local voting patterns just prior to the occurrence of a critical realignment is relevant here because the voter partitions specified in Figure 1 provide the electoral raw materials from which partisan realignments are forged. That is, the size of the various partitions determines the number of potential voters who can be converted, mobilized, or demobilized.
The electoral setting is thus likely to be a prime determinant of electoral dynamics. The social setting is also likely to be consequential since it conditions political change. In general we posit that 1) the larger the pool of core Republican voters in a locale at the time of a disequilibrating external event such as an economic or moral crisis, the larger the role conversion will play in the generation of Democratic realignments, 2) the larger the local pool of core Democratic voters, the larger the role conversion will play in Republican realignments, 3) the larger the local pool of minor party voters, the larger the role that minor party conversion will play, and 4) the larger the local pool of non-voters, the larger the role that mobilization will play.
We test these expectations using the following core normal voter variables which are lagged by Social networks are likely to be stronger in rural counties than in urban areas. Strong social networks are likely to strengthen partisan ties, impeding conversion. Such social networks also work against mobilization, as they produce fewer non-immunized citizens to mobilize. As a consequence, we expect Rural to exhibit a negative relationship with conversion and mobilization while Big City exhibits a positive relationship with both dynamics.
Also important in this regard are demographic changes in the makeup of locales.
Demographic change is important because large influxes of politically marginalized groups are likely to result in weaker, or at least more disjointed, social networks. Thus, we expect conversion and mobilization to be positively related to three demographic variables: % change in the overall population (Population Change), % change in the foreign-born population (Foreign Born Change), and % change in the African American population (African American Change), with these differenced versions of the variables capturing the change in these populations in the city or county over an eight-year period.
Political Setting. We expect two types of political factors to be relevant here. The second relevant political factor is the years lapsed since the last critical realignment. Beck (1974) argues that realignments occur with some regularity because the issues and factors that lead to the onset of a realignment fade over time as memories fade and generational replacement proceeds apace. This "aging process" weakens the grip of parties on their adherents, making conversion more likely. As a corollary, mobilization should also become more likely as the concerns of the preceding realignment fade in importance with time. To examine Beck's thesis we include a variable, Length, measuring the number of years since an electoral unit's last realignment. To allow for non-linearity in the effect of the length of time since the last realignment, we also include a quadratic term, Length Squared.
Electoral Dynamics across Time and Space
To examine the sources of realignment dynamics, we employed OLS regressions for four types of enduring electoral change: conversion of Republicans to Democrats, conversion of Democrats to Republicans, conversion of minor party supporters to the major parties, and mobilization of non-voters. It was possible to analyze conversion of minor party supporters to the major parties as well as mobilization of non-voters without regard to which party benefited from the electoral shifts. But analyses of conversions of Republicans to Democrats and Democrats to Republicans had to be conducted separately because different independent variables were posited to have different effects depending upon the partisan direction of the conversions. The results of these regressions are reported in Table 3 .
The Conversion of Republicans to Democrats
The analysis of the conversion of Republicans to Democrats was conducted using 2090 cases; it yields an R 2 of .34. The regression results are summarized in Table 3 As expected, strong Republican parties at the state and local levels impede the conversion of Republican voters to the Democratic Party. Moreover, although the interaction term does not have a negative effect, the overall effect of the three partisan strength variables is negative, as hypothesized. A simulation using the regression equation reported in Table 3 can be used to illustrate this. We begin by positing a rural county. We then assign all other terms in the The final two covariates examine the impact on conversion of the years lapsed since the last realignment. Neither Length nor Length Squared have an effect on conversion. As a consequence, we find no evidence that conversion from the Republican to the Democratic parties becomes more likely as the preceding realignment fades in memory.
The Conversion of Democrats to Republicans
The analysis of conversion of Democrats to Republicans was conducted using 1,550 cases and has an R 2 of .15, as seen in Table 3 , column 2. Lagged Core Democratic Voters, which measures the size of the pool of Democratic voters from which to draw, is a strong determinant of conversions of Democrats to Republicans. Thus, as was the case with conversions of Republicans to Democrats, the larger the potential pool of active voters from which to draw, the larger the role of conversion.
As with conversion to the Democratic Party, neither of the locale dummy variables has a significant relationship with conversion to the Republican Party. In contrast to the Democratic conversion case, however, Foreign Born Change also exhibits no effect on conversion to the Republicans. Growing local immigrant populations, likely to be predisposed toward the Democratic Party, did not promote the conversion of Democrats into Republicans, but also did not impede this conversion. As in the Democratic conversion analysis, the time elapsed since the previous realignment also had no effect on the conversion of Democrats to Republicans.
Once again, we find that party dominance limits the conversion of a party's adherents during critical realignments. 
Conversion from Minor Parties
The analysis of conversion from minor parties to the major parties was conducted using 3653 cases and has an R 2 of .62. The dominant variable in this equation is, by far, the relative size of the local minor party constituency. The larger the size of this constituency, the greater its contribution to the net partisan gain of the advantaged party. This is consistent with independent evidence (MacRae and Meldrum 1960) that minor parties may serve as "halfway houses" for the expression of voter discontent prior to realignments. Our analysis suggests that partisan realignments routinely absorb most of these minor party voters, corralling them into the local constituency of the major party advantaged by the realignment. The conversion of minor party supporters is also promoted by growing populations of immigrants in the locale, who are likely to provide political communication to minor party supporters that especially promotes conversion to the Democratic Party. The remaining social setting variables had no effect.
Because the party strength and length variables were relevant only for the major party conversion analyses, they were not used here.
Mobilization
The analysis of the mobilization of non-voters was conducted using 3640 cases; it yields an R 2 of .22. A critical determinant of mobilization, as with the other realignment dynamics, is the electoral setting. The most relevant component here is, of course, the relative size of the non-voter population; it defines the pool of non-voters available for mobilization. As expected, the lagged core non-voting population is strongly and positively related to mobilization.
Two of the social setting variables also figure significantly in mobilization. Rural locales impede mobilization. This is as predicted, as such locales are likely to promote the political immunization and routine participation of citizens, providing fewer opportunities for mobilization. Alternatively, population change engenders mobilization. Here, we expect that locales experiencing significant population growth have weaker social networks and more politically marginalized citizens, providing more opportunities for the mobilization of nonvoters.
Although the length of time since the previous realignment has no effect on conversion, we find that it has a significant effect on the mobilization of non-voters. Consistent with Beck's socialization thesis, as the issues of the preceding realignment fade in salience, they provide less motivation for voting, engendering subsequent mobilization during the succeeding realignment.
Assuming a big city locale, mobilization accounts for 31 percent of the critical change in a unit if the years elapsed since the previous realignment are just 24. This increases to 36 percent for 36 years and 41 percent when 48 years have elapsed since the previous realignment.
Summary and Conclusions
This study differs from earlier efforts to understand the dynamics of critical realignments in several ways. First, it builds on a comprehensive historical archive that integrates several bodies of data with normal vote estimates for over 3,100 local electorates in the U. The results of this analysis, when combined with other findings from its related studies, provide valuable insights into the nature of electoral accountability in American democracy. An analysis of voting trends in the U.S. since 1828 demonstrates the capacity of voters to hold policymaking elites accountable. Critical realignments have been highly structured, both temporally and spatially, and they have been large enough to upset existing electoral equilibria at the national level. This analysis provides another key insight into the nature of these electoral upheavals: the dominant role of conversion in the generation of critical realignments. The regression analyses reported in Table 3 suggest some "inefficiencies" in realignment dynamics (i.e., the role of dominant party organizations in impeding conversion). However, despite these inefficiencies, the fact remains that conversion -the electoral dynamic that is cognitively most demanding, normatively quite appealing and instrumentally most efficient -has accounted for the vast majority of critical electoral change since the beginning of mass suffrage. Thus, it is clear that these inefficiencies have not prevented the electorate from registering its discontent at critical junctures in the American experience.
Appendix: Assumptions Underlying the Logic of Dynamic Processes
The key assumption underlying the logic used to define the realignment dynamics variables is that the electoral shifts reflected in the difference patterns discussed above are the result of the simplest conceivable movement involving the smallest number of voters: the simplest movement of the smallest number assumption (SMSN assumption). For a simple mobilization pattern, (+,0,+,0), the "simplest movement of the smallest number" assumption would mean that the increases in core voters and core Republican voters are due simply to an influx of new core voters who aligned with the Republicans.
However plausible the SMSN assumption is, it is not the only possible interpretation of a difference pattern such as (+,0,+,0). Consider the case in which the size of the core electorate and the size of the Republican constituency for a given county in a particular election both increased by 1,000 voters between t 0 and t 1 . The SMSN assumption attributes these changes to a mobilization of 1,000 non-core voters who became core Republican partisans. However, those increases could also have been generated by the following pattern of movements: 1) a demobilization of 1,000 core voters who were core Democratic partisans at t 0 , perhaps a cohesive group that became disaffected over a series of policy changes or political events (scandals, recessions, etc.); and 2) a mobilization of 2,000 non-core voters who divide their loyalties equally between the Democrats and Republicans.
While these electoral movements would result in the generation of a (+,0,+,0) difference pattern, this interpretation is less credible than that provided by the SMSN assumption, for two reasons. First, the more elaborate movements described above require changes in the habitual behavior of three times as many voters (3,000 as opposed to 1,000 Despite the fact that the SMSN assumption is more plausible and more compatible with individual-level voting research, it is impossible to refute rival hypotheses definitively using only aggregate data. It is, nonetheless, possible to conduct an empirical test that will shed some light on the viability of the SMSN assumption, as well as the plausibility of rival hypotheses.
The "equivalency test" offered here examines the equivalency of the electoral shifts that the SMSN assumption assumes to be the only factors driving enduring electoral change. Consider, for example, a county that experienced a critical realignment that favored the Republicans and in which all of the critical change was attributed to mobilization. In such a case, all of the observed changes should be in the proportions of core voters and core Republican voters. If this county had an increase in the proportion of core voters of .10, an increase in the proportion of core Republican voters of .10, and no changes in the proportions of core Democratic or minor party voters, then it would qualify as evidencing equivalency under the equivalency test.
A finding that the shifts assumed to be determinative are equivalent would provide empirical support for the SMSN assumption in two ways. First, it would demonstrate that there is not much electoral change that is unaccounted for by the SMSN-based analyses. Second, it would make rival hypotheses more implausible because of the tenuousness of equivalent shifts among multiple sets of voters. The empirical examination of the equivalency test provides solid support for the SMSN assumption. Two versions of the equivalency test were constructed. The
"near equivalency test" shows that 97 percent of the electoral shifts analyzed were within +/-.01 of one another. The "identical equivalency test" found that 85 percent of the electoral shifts were identical. 
